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Abstract
This paper presents a simple new trade theory model with results that contradict those 
from standard models in two ways. Firstly, a home market effect in domestic sales of ma-
nufactured goods is found to co-exist with a reversed home market effect in exports of 
manufactured goods. While small countries have a disadvantage in domestic sales of ma-
nufactured goods given their access to small domestic markets, they have an advantage 
in exports of manufactured goods given their access to large export markets. Secondly, 
initially equal firms split into exporters and non-exporters in equilibrium; and market 
conditions, rather than firm-level differences in marginal costs, are the main determinants 
of the number of manufacturing firms that export. In consequence of these two results, for 
a small country the number of manufacturing of firms that export is higher than propor-
tional to country size. The extensive margin of exports, defined as the proportion of firms 
that export, decreases with relative size of the home market. Empirical support for the lat-
ter prediction is found in a cross-sectional dataset on firm level exports for 116 countries. 
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1 Introduction 
Will trade liberalisation lead to deindustrialisation of small 
countries? A well-known result from new trade theory 
models is the home market effect (HME), first introduced 
formally by Krugman (1980). The argument is as follows: 
increasing returns and transport costs in manufacturing 
industries make access to a large home market 
advantageous. It is therefore less profitable for 
manufacturing firms to be established in small countries. In 
consequence, small countries may offer lower wages, or have 
a share of the world’s production and exports of 
manufactured goods that is less than proportional to their 
share of labour. Some authors predict that the effect will be 
reinforced by trade liberalisation (Helpman and Krugman 
1985, pp. 205–209, henceforth: HK 1985), while others 
predict that the effect will follow an inverse U relationship, 
where it is weakened for very low trade costs (Krugman and 
Venables, 1990). This has led to concern as to whether small 
countries are likely to have lower income per capita or 
become deindustrialised. 
 
However, several studies show that small countries in 
general do not have lower GDP per capita than large ones. 
(See e.g. Easterly and Kraay, 2000; Rose, 2006.1) Moreover, 
in several small countries, manufactured goods account for a 
large proportion of their total exports. Examples include 
many prosperous countries, among them Singapore, Finland 
and Luxembourg, but also less developed countries. Eastern 
European countries, like the Slovak Republic and Estonia, 
and other emerging markets, like Mauritius and Namibia, 
have experienced growth in GDP per capita, and the 
proportion of manufactured goods in their total exports is 
relatively high. This may indicate that being a small country 
is not as great a disadvantage as indicated by the literature 
on the HME. 
 
                                                 
1  Furthermore, Ramondo and Rodríguez-Clare (2010) and Ramondo, Rodríguez-
Clare and Saborío-Rodríguez (2012) discuss the issue of small countries being 
much richer than predicted by models of idea-based growth. 
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A weakness of HME models is that lower profitability of 
domestic sales of manufactured goods in small countries 
often induces lower profitability of exports of manufactured 
goods. In other words, the HME applies not only to domestic 
sales of manufactured goods, but also to exports of such 
goods.  However, relatively small countries may have access 
to relatively large export markets, and this could make 
exports more profitable in small countries than in large ones. 
Generally, this mechanism is present in models with 
constant returns to scale, but in the HME models it is 
normally completely dominated by the disadvantage of 
access to a small home market. This might not be a good 
description of real life. Even if a relatively small home 
market is a disadvantage for domestic sales of manufactured 
goods, it can be an advantage for exports of manufactured 
goods. This could yield a reverse HME in exports, where 
small countries have a more than proportional share of the 
world’s export of manufactured goods. The first aim of this 
paper is to show how an HME in domestic sales of 
manufactured goods may coexist with a reverse HME in 
exports of manufactured goods in a simple model of 
international trade. To my knowledge, no other authors have 
discussed this dichotomy. 
 
Why do some firms become exporters while others do not? 
What factors determine the number of firms that export? 
The literature has generally focused on firm differences in 
answering these questions. After the pioneering article of 
Melitz (2003) it has become common to include fixed export 
costs and firm differences in marginal production costs in 
trade models. This ensures that only the most productive 
firms will find it profitable to export. However, not only firm 
differences, but also the relative size of the foreign market 
may be important for firms’ export decisions. If the home 
market is small and the foreign market is large, many firms 
may find it profitable to export, whereas a relatively small 
foreign market may have room for only a few exporters. A 
weakness of HME models, whether dealing with 
homogeneous or heterogeneous firms, is that, as long as 
there is free entry of firms, they often predict that the 
number of manufacturing exporters will increase with 
relative size of the home market due to the HME. In other 
words, it decreases with the relative size of the foreign 
market. The HK 1985 model is a benchmark HME model 
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which is used as point of departure for many other models. 
There are no fixed export costs and firms are homogeneous, 
thus the model predicts that either all firms will export or no 
firms will. Consequently, the HME in the total number of 
manufacturing firms leads directly to an HME in the 
number of exporters. The result may be seen as an undesired 
side effect of the fact that homogeneous-firms models are not 
able to separate between exporting and non-exporting firms. 
However, the effect is also found in the much used Melitz-
style extension of HK 1985, where only a proportion of firms 
export (a model like that is e.g. presented in Baldwin and 
Forslid, 2010). In that model, the extensive margin of 
exports, defined as the proportion of firms that export, will 
be independent of country size.2 This leads to the same 
negative relationship between the number of manufacturing 
exporters and the size of the foreign market as found in its 
homogeneous-firms counterpart. 
 
The second aim of this paper is to show how export market 
conditions, rather than firm differences in marginal costs, 
can be the main determinants of the number of exporters. It 
is not surprising that different firms behave differently as in 
Melitz-type models. In the model presented here, however, I 
show that even firms that are initially equal may behave 
differently in equilibrium and become heterogeneous with 
respect to export status. The model contains many of the 
same properties as Melitz-type models, despite no firm-level 
differences in production costs. For example, the intensive 
margin of trade is independent of variable trade costs but 
decreases with reductions in fixed export costs, just as in 
Lawless (2010). Furthermore, there is an anti-variety effect 
from reductions in variable trade costs just as in Baldwin 
and Forslid (2010). Despite these similarities, the model 
differs sharply from standard models when it comes to 
predictions about the number of firms that export. In 
equilibrium the total number of manufacturing firms in a 
small country relative to that in a large country is less than 
proportional to relative country size, due to the HME. At the 
same time, the relative number of manufacturing exporters 
is more than proportional, due to the reverse HME. As a 
consequence, the extensive margin of exports, defined as the 
                                                 
2  Note that this definition of the extensive margin of export differs somewhat 
from other papers. Normally, it refers to the number of firms that export, but 
in this paper it refers to the proportion of firms that export. 
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proportion of firms that export, will be higher in small 
countries than in large ones.  
 
The third aim of this paper is to present empirical evidence 
of larger extensive margins of exports in small countries 
than in large countries – which we would observe in the 
presence of a reverse HME in exports. Very little evidence 
exists on this point. To my knowledge only one study has 
dealt with this issue, and then only briefly, without 
econometric testing. The International Study Group on 
Exports and Productivity (2008) compares firm level data on 
exporters and non-exporters between 14 countries and finds 
that the extensive margin of exports is ‘loosely decreasing in 
the size of the domestic markets’ (p. 5). In this paper, I use 
firm level data for exports of manufactured goods for 116 
developing countries from the Enterprise Surveys dataset. 
Results show that, for the average country, a doubling of 
relative home market size is associated with a 12.3% 
decrease in the extensive margin of exports.  
 
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 gives an 
overview of related literature, Section 3 presents the 
theoretical model, Section 4 presents the empirical evidence, 
and Section 5 offers some conclusions. 
 
2 Related literature 
Traditional trade models, characterized by constant returns 
to scale (CRS) and comparative advantage, generally predict 
that countries are net exporters of goods for which they have 
low domestic demand (Davis and Weinstein, 1999). Krugman 
(1980), on the other hand, showed that under increasing 
returns to scale (IRS) and trade costs there will be an HME: 
a country with relatively low domestic demand for an IRS 
good will have lower profitability in the production of this 
good. This results in less IRS firms locating in a country like 
that and the country getting a lower-than-proportional share 
of the world’s production as well as exports of the IRS good. 
Consequently, in contrast to the case for CRS goods, 
countries will be net importers of IRS goods for which they 
have low domestic demand. Alternatively, if firm relocation 
is not possible, the HME results in lower wages instead of 
less firms. The HME has been shown to be robust to several 
different model specifications (for an overview, see 
Felbermayr and Jung, 2012).  
 
The benchmark model of two countries, two sectors, and one 
factor, presented in HK 1985, will serve as the basis for the 
discussion in the present paper. This model posits one 
homogenous good CRS sector with perfect competition and 
no trade costs, and one IRS manufacturing sector with 
monopolistic competition and trade costs. As long as there is 
some production of the homogenous good in both countries, 
wages will equalise. In this case, the HME will result in the 
relative number of manufacturing firms in the small country 
being less than proportional to relative country size. 
Whereas firms are homogeneous and face variable export 
costs only in the HK 1985 model, the effect also arises in the 
corresponding Melitz-type model with fixed export costs and 
firm-level differences in marginal costs (see e.g. Baldwin and 
Forslid, 2010 for a model like that). These models are 
frequently used as point of departures for other models. A 
weakness of both models is that the less-than-proportional 
number of manufacturing firms in the small country induces 
a less-than-proportional number of manufacturing exporters. 
Consequently, the relative number of manufacturing 
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exporters increases with relative size of the home market 
and hence decreases with the relative size of the export 
market. The reason is that, in the case of the homogeneous 
firms model, either all firms or no firms export; and, in the 
case of the Melitz-type model, that the extensive margin of 
exports (defined as the proportion of firms that export) is 
independent of country size. In both models, average sales 
per firm in the domestic market are equal in the two 
countries, as are average exports. Consequently, the HME 
applies to a country’s production and exports as well as to its 
number of firms and exporters. 
 
Several empirical studies have attempted to find evidence of 
the HME. Some has focused on the production side, others 
on the export side, of the HME hypothesis. Some studies also 
take into account that there may be ‘home-bias’ in demand 
(consumers may have stronger preferences for domestically 
produced goods than for foreign produced goods). In a survey 
of early contributions, Head and Mayer (2004) conclude that 
the evidence is mixed: ‘One can see some support for HMEs 
in some industries in some specifications. However reverse 
HMEs (coefficients on demand of less than one or on home 
biased demand of less than zero) are more frequent.’ (p. 
2642). Conclusions from more recent contributions are also 
ambiguous. For example, Crozet and Trionfetti (2008) study 
the relationship between production shares and demand 
shares. They find some evidence of HMEs, but the economic 
significance is small. On average, the HME influences 
specialization in only about 12.5% of the 25 countries under 
study, and in these countries it influences specialization in 
62% of the manufacturing activity. Hanson and Xiang (2004) 
focus on the relationship between export shares and GDP. 
They present a model of multiple countries and industries 
and show that industries with high transport costs and more 
differentiated products will concentrate in large countries 
due to the HME. They find strong empirical support for this 
pattern. However, their results have been questioned by 
Pham, Lovely and Mitra (2009), who apply different 
methodological procedures on the same data and find little 
evidence of a HME.  
 
Also several theoretical contributions have shown that the 
HME does not necessarily arise in models where production 
is characterized by IRS. A reverse HME in exports can occur 
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if firm entry is restricted. For example, Medin (2003) 
introduces a specific factor in fixed production costs, into the 
HK 1985 model. In practice this means that entry is 
restricted by the endowment of the specific factor and that 
the relative number of manufacturing firms becomes 
proportional to relative country size. Also in Chaney (2008) 
the mass of firms is exogenously given and proportional to 
country size. In both these models the decision to export is 
separated from the decision to sell in the domestic market by 
fixed export costs, and the number of exporters becomes 
negatively related to relative home market size. This is the 
effect that is referred to as the “foreign market effect” in 
Medin (2003). Similarly, a reverse HME in export values 
rather than the number of exporting firms arises when there 
is only one firm in each country. This is shown in the model 
with Cournot competition and homogeneous goods in 
Feenstra, Markusen and Rose (2001). 
 
Other modifications of the cost side of the HK 1985 model 
can also affect the HME. Davis (1998) shows that the HME 
may disappear if the CRS sector is subject to sufficiently 
high transport costs. Further, Okubo and Rebeyrol (2006) 
show that higher fixed production costs in the large country 
can produce a reverse HME with respect to the number of 
manufacturing firms and exporters. 
 
Also demand-side modifications of the HK 1985 model may 
cause a reverse HME. In Yu (2005) manufactured and 
homogenous goods enter the utility function as CES 
aggregates rather than Cobb-Douglas aggregates. If the 
elasticity of substitution between the manufactured and the 
homogenous goods is lower than one, consumers’ expenditure 
share for manufactured goods in the small country is higher 
than in the large country. This makes it more profitable to 
establish a manufacturing firm in the small country, and a 
reverse HME in the number of manufacturing firms and 
exporters will arise. In a Cournot competition model with 
linear demand, Head, Mayer and Rise (2002) show that a 
reverse HME in the number of manufacturing firms and 
exporters may emerge when products are differentiated by 
nations rather than firms, as long as products are 
sufficiently differentiated. 
3 Theory 
None of the above-mentioned models distinguishes the HME 
in the number of manufacturing firms from the reverse HME 
in the number of manufacturing exporters. By contrast, the 
model presented here allows for these two effects to coexist. 
It merges the notion of benefit of a large foreign market, 
predicted by traditional trade models, with the notion of 
disadvantage of a small home market, predicted by the HME 
literature. To my knowledge no other articles have discussed 
this dichotomy.  
 
I follow Venables (1994) in introducing fixed export costs, 
national product differentiation, and a two-level nested CES 
subutility function for manufactured goods into the HK 1985 
model. This allows a firm’s export decision to be separated 
from its decision to sell in the domestic market. As a 
consequence, initially equal firms divide into exporters and 
non-exporters in equilibrium and hence become 
heterogeneous with respect to export status.3 As opposed to 
Venables (1994), the present model considers countries of 
different sizes, with multiple manufacturing industries 
within each country.  
 
The number of manufacturing industries in each country is 
exogenously given, whereas the number of firms within each 
industry is allowed to vary freely. The model thus combines 
the idea of restricted entry, found in e.g. Medin (2003) or 
Chaney (2008)4, with the idea of free entry, found in e.g. HK 
                                                 
3  Medin (2003) presents another model with the same feature. Both models 
introduce fixed export costs into the HK 1985 model. However, in order to 
render possible an equilibrium with the coexistence of exporters and non-
exporters, more structure has to be added to the HK 1985 model. In Medin 
(2003) more structure is added to the supply side, while in the present model 
more structure is added to the demand as well as to the supply side. In an 
appendix in Medin (2003) a model similar to the present model (albeit with 
only one manufacturing industry in each country) is outlined, but the full 
model is not written out. Also Yeaple (2005) presents a model of initially 
equal firms where exporters and non-exporters coexist. In that model, labour 
is heterogeneous, and firms become different with respect to choice of 
production technology, type of labour employed and export status. None of 
these models describe the coexistence of an HME in the number of 
manufacturing firms and a reverse HME in the number of manufacturing 
exporters. In Medin (2003) the number of manufacturing firms is proportional 
to country size; the two other models consider countries of equal size. 
4  Note that here it is industry entry, rather than firm-entry that is restricted. 
10 Hege Medin 
1985 or Baldwin and Forslid (2010). As in the latter two 
models, trade costs and IRS in production of manufactured 
goods lead to lower profitability of manufacturing production 
in the small country. Since the number of industries is 
exogenous, this cannot result in a lower-than-proportional 
number of industries. Instead it results in a lower number of 
firms within each industry and also in a lower-than-
proportional total number of firms. However, this HME in 
the number of firms does not induce an HME in the number 
of exporters. Due to national product differentiation, large 
demand in the large country is directed towards foreign as 
well as domestic manufactured goods. Since the export 
decision is separated from the decision to sell in the domestic 
market by fixed export costs, this allows for a larger number 
of exporters within each industry and also a larger-than-
proportional total number of exporters in the small country. 
The model serves as an illustration of the highly polar case 
where demand-side conditions and restricted entry create a 
reverse HME in the number of exporters, but, at the same 
time, IRS, trade costs and free entry create an HME in the 
number of firms selling in the domestic market. As a 
consequence of the reverse HME in exports, the extensive 
margin of exports (defined as the proportion of firms that 
exports) is larger in small countries. 
3.1 Setup of the model 
There are two countries, home and foreign, indexed by i, j = 
h, f, where h is smaller than f. Labour l, is the only input, 
and it is supplied inelastically. There are two economic 
sectors in each country. The first sector produces a 
homogenous good with CRS and zero export costs, and this 
ensures that wages are equalised between the two countries. 
As is customary, I normalise the wage to 1. The only income 
is wage; thus total income, y, equals l. The other sector 
consists of many manufacturing firms, each producing a 
unique variety, indexed by .  , where   is the set of all 
potentially available goods. Firms have constant marginal 
production costs φ. In addition, they have to pay a fixed cost 
to enter the domestic market, F, and a fixed export costs, G.5 
                                                 
5  Note that F is interpreted as a domestic market entry cost, not a fixed 
production cost. This is in line with interpretation in several recent 
contributions, including Baldwin and Forslid (2010) and Felbermayr and 
Jung (2012). Mathematically, the model would look the same if F were 
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There are also variable iceberg export costs ( 1 ). As the 
present article studies market size asymmetries rather than 
firm asymmetries, I disregard the modelling of firm 
differences in marginal production costs that is now common 
in trade models (see Melitz, 2003). Consequently, I assume 
that φ, as well as F and G are equal for all firms, 
independently of country of origin, so that all firms are 
symmetric. Manufacturing firms are grouped into industries 
that are country-bounded, and there is an exogenous number 
of m symmetric industries within a country.6  
 
Preferences are represented by a three-level utility function. 
The first level is a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of homogenous 
and manufactured goods, with expenditure share of 
manufactured goods equal to μ. In the following analysis, I 
assume that μ is sufficiently small to ensure that both 
countries produce the homogenous good, so that wages will 
be equalised (see Appendix 3 for details). Subutility for 
manufactured goods is a two-level nested CES aggregate. 
The inner level is a CES aggregate over varieties belonging 
to the same industry, with elasticity of substitution equal to 
ε. This approach allows us to treat all varieties from the 
same industry as an aggregated composite industry good. 
The outer level is a CES aggregate over composite industry 
goods for which the elasticity of substitution is equal to η. 
Since industries are country-bounded, this implies that 
consumers will want to differentiate their consumption 
between foreign and domestically produced goods, as well as 
between varieties from the same country. It is reasonable to 
expect varieties within the same industry to be more 
substitutable than varieties between industries, thus I 
assume that ε>η>1.7 
 
                                                 
interpreted as fixed production costs, as long as the proportion of firms that 
export is lower than 1 in both countries (see below).  
6  Such national product differentiation could reflect Ricardian comparative 
advantages, or comparative institutional advantages. It could also reflect the 
existence of immobile country-specific factors. The model does not have 
enough structure to let both the number of industries and the number of firms 
be endogenous. 
7  Similar nested CES functions are frequently used in multiproduct firm 
models to distinguish varieties produced by the same firm from varieties 
produced by different firms. See Allanson and Montagna (2005), Arkolakis 
and Muendler (2010), and Bernard, Redding and Schott (2011). Venables 
(1994) and Jorgensen and Schroder (2006) use it to separate domestically-
produced varieties from foreign-produced ones, as here. 
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I assume that m is lower in the small country. This seems 
reasonable, as large countries may have access to a wider 
range of inputs (e.g. natural resources) or may have a 
greater variety of preferences. There may also be economies 
of scale and the industry level which make room for more 
industries in large countries. The assumption is supported 
by empirical evidence. For example, Parteka and Tamberi 
(2013) investigate several measures of export diversification 
in manufacturing industries for 60 countries over 20 years. 
They find a positive relationship between country size 
(measured in either population size or GDP) and export 
diversification indices. In particular, I assume that the 
relative number of industries is proportional to the relative 
country size, i.e. Y=M<1, where
fh mmM  and fh yyY  . 
For the sake of comparison, I will also consider the case 
where M=1. Nevertheless, this case appears less realistic, as 
it contradicts the empirical evidence mentioned above; and it 
makes the demand effect from the large country towards 
small-country products unreasonably large.8 The results 
from the analysis below will hold also when Y<M<1. 
However, the size of M may affect the range of expenditure 
share of manufactured goods (μ) that renders possible an 
equilibrium with non-specialisation in both countries (see 
Appendix 3 for details). Further, it may affect the ranges of 
Y, G and τ that render possible an equilibrium with 
proportions of firms that export below 1 in both countries 
(see Appendix 4 for details). Since all industries within a 
country are symmetric, the number of firms in an industry in 
country i (
in ) and the proportion of these that sell in country 
j, ( ijs ) will be equal across all industries within the country. 
Firms are monopolistically competitive, so the producer price 
for a single variety is a constant mark-up over marginal 
costs and it is equal for all firms, independent of country and 
industry of origin: 
(1)  
1



p  
                                                 
8  For M =1, an equal number of foreign and domestic composite industry goods 
would enter the utility function, regardless of how small the smallest country 
were. If the large country were 100 times larger than the small and there 
were no export costs, foreign demand towards small-country manufactured 
goods would be 100 times higher than foreign demand towards large-country 
manufactured goods.  
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Using (1), we can characterise demand by the following 
expressions (see Appendix 1 for derivation).9 
 
Demand from country i for a firm from country j:  
 (2) 
  
 pPQYc
jijiiiji
11
 
The price index for manufactured goods in country i: 
(3)      1
1
11
jijiiii PmPmQ   
The price index in country i for a composite industry good 
produced in country j: 
(4) pnsP jijjiji 


1
1
)(   
Since there are four possible combinations of h and f, (2) and 
(4) represent four equations each, while (3) represents two 
equations, one for each country. 
I assume symmetric variable export costs, thus   jiij , i 
≠ j. There are no domestic trade cost, thus 1 jjii  . 
ij
s denote proportion of firms from country i that sell in 
country j. Either all firms sell in their domestic market and 
only some of them export (i.e. 1iis  and 1ijs ); or all firms 
export and only some sell in their domestic markets (i.e. 
1iis  and 1ijs ).10 The relationship between export costs 
and market size determines which of the ijs will equal one, 
and in the following I assume that these are related in a way 
that ensures that 1
ii
s and 1ijs .11 This is reasonable, as 
empirical evidence generally shows that only a fraction of 
firms export, and very few firms that export do not sell also 
in their domestic markets. For example, in a representative 
                                                 
9  Since firms and industries are symmetric, we can disregard indexing them. It 
is sufficient to characterize a firm and an industry by country of origin. 
10  Also possible is a situation where all firms export in h, while only a fraction 
exports in f: i.e. sij = sjj =1 and sii<1, sji<1. See Appendix 4 for details. 
11  Criteria for this to happen are discussed in Appendix 4. Also see Felbermayr 
and Jung (2012) for a similar discussion in a model with firms with different 
marginal costs. 
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sample of firms from developing countries from the 
Enterprise Survey dataset, some 21.5% of them exported 
some of their output, whereas only 1.5% exported all their 
output (see section 4.1. in the present paper for details about 
the dataset). WTO (2008) and Bernard et al. (2011) present 
surveys of empirical evidence on firm level exports.  
In equilibrium there are two types of firms in each country: 
non-exporters and exporters (the latter also sell in their 
domestic market). Since there are constant marginal 
production costs and separate fixed costs of entry in the 
domestic market and the export market, a firm’s profits in 
the two markets can be analysed separately. These are given 
by:  
 
(5)   Fzp iiii    
(6)   Gzp ijij     
iiz  and ijz  represent the sales of a firm from country i in the 
domestic market and export market respectively; together, 
they amount to the firm’s total output, iz . There is free entry 
of firms in both markets; thus, profits in each market must 
equal zero. Inserting (1) in (5) and (6) and setting profits 
equal to 0 yields two separate free entry conditions, one for 
firms selling in the domestic market only, and one additional 
condition for firms that also export. In equilibrium there will 
be a total number of 
in  firms, but only a subset iijns of these 
will export.  Hence, iiz  is positive for all firms, while ijz is 
positive only for exporters.12 By rearranging, we can solve for 
a firm’s sales in its domestic and foreign market respectively:  
 (7) Fzii

 1
  
                                                 
12  Note that the definition of a ‘firm’ is that it produces a unique variety ω. An 
alternative interpretation of the model is that exporters and non-exporters 
are different firms that produce different unique varieties.  
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(8) Gzij

 1
  
 (7) shows that all firms sell the same amount in their 
domestic market, independent of country of origin. Similarly, 
(8) shows that all exporters sell the same amount in their 
export market. (1), (3) and (4) in (2) yield four demand 
functions (for domestically and foreign produced varieties in 
the two countries); and (7) and (8) represent four supply 
functions (for domestic sales and exports in the two 
countries). By setting supply equal to demand, we can solve 
for the four endogenous variables: ijs and in . See Appendix 2 
for derivation of the equilibrium.  
 
The present model differs from Melitz-type models in the 
mechanisms that create coexistence of exporters and non-
exporters. In Melitz-type models some firms start exporting 
because they are different from others.  The main 
determinant of whether or not a firm exports is its 
productivity. By contrast, in the present model, all firms are 
initially equal, but we get an equilibrium where firms 
become different with respect to export status. It is not 
possible a priori to tell which firms will become exporters 
and which will not. The export market is simply not large 
enough to include all firms.13 It is not my intention to claim 
that firms do not differ in their marginal production costs, 
but in this paper I have chosen to work with initially equal 
firms because I wish to focus on export market conditions, 
rather than firm differences in marginal production costs, as 
determinants of firms' export status. All firms face demand 
from the domestic market, but exporters face demand from 
abroad as well. This tends to increase the number of 
exporters. On the other hand, exporters face fixed and 
variable export costs, and this tends to reduce the number of 
exporters. The extensive margin of exports, ijs , depends on 
the relative importance of these mechanisms. 
                                                 
13  Examples of other models that have the same feature are Venables (1994), 
Medin (2003) and Yeaple (2005). Conceptually this is not different from the 
fact that in the Dixit-Stiglitz model there is a potential number of Ω firms in 
the economy, but the market is not big enough for all of them; thus, in 
equilibrium, only a subset actually produce. 
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3.2 The HME in the number of firms 
The total number of firms in country i is given by: 
(9)  
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The number of firms within an industry in  will be lower in 
the small country for M=Y as well as for M=1. Tt  is an 
aggregate of variable export costs and domestic market entry 
costs relative to fixed export costs. It is a measure of 
openness. It is reasonable to assume that firms face higher 
fixed export costs than domestic market entry costs, as costs 
related to conducting market analyses, setting up 
distribution networks, acquiring information about laws, 
rules and business cultures, etc. are likely to be higher in a 
less familiar market. I therefore focus on the case where 
fixed export costs are higher than domestic market entry 
costs (G>F). This ensures that 1Tt .14 1Tt  implies 
no variable export costs  1t  and fixed export costs equal 
to entry costs in the domestic markets  1T . The 
expression is equal to 0 if either variable or fixed export 
costs are infinitely high. 
As in standard models, this model produces a HME in 
domestic sales summarized as follows:  
 
PROPOSITION 1. (The home market effect in the number of 
firms): 
The number of manufacturing firms selling in the domestic 
market in the small country will be less than proportional to 
country size. 
 
                                                 
14  See Melitz (2003), Baldwin and Forslid (2010) or Felbermayr and Jung (2012) 
for a similar measure. Note that Tβtβ<1 is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for the existence of non-exporters in both countries. See Appendix 4 
for details. 
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Proof: The number of firms located in the home country 
relative to the number of firms located in the foreign country 
is given by: 
(10)    
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For M=Y, the relative number of firms, MN, this is less 
than proportional to Y. In other words, the small country 
has a less-than-proportional number of manufacturing firms, 
and the model therefore produces an HME. Since all firms 
sell the same amount in their domestic markets, 
independent of country of origin (see Equation 7), the HME 
applies to the number of manufacturing firms as well as to 
total domestic sales.  
 
The mechanism behind the HME in the number of firms is 
similar to that in standard models (e.g. HK 1985 and 
Baldwin and Forslid, 2010)15. There are proportionally fewer 
industries in the small country. All consumers want to 
consume some of each composite industry good, thus each 
small-country industry experiences lower domestic demand 
than each large-country industry. This makes each small-
country industry is less profitable. If the number of 
industries in a country were allowed to vary, this would have 
lead to a lower-than-proportional number of industries in the 
small country.16 However, since the number of industries is 
exogenous, the lower profitability instead results in fewer 
firms within each industry.  
 
For M=1, domestic demand towards a domestic industry is 
proportional to country size. MN=Y, and there is no HME.  
                                                 
15  Note, however that the HME is dampened as compared to those models for 
large country size differences or high degree of openness. The reason is that 
consumers want to diversify their consumption between foreign and domestic 
composite industry goods, thus the small country will never get 
deindustrialised. 
16  This is analogous to the lower-than-proportional number of firms in HK 1985 
and Baldwin and Forslid (2010). 
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3.3 The reverse HME in the number of exporters 
A key result from the model which will be tested empirically 
in Section 4 is summarised as follows: 
 
PROPOSITION 2. (Higher extensive margin in the small 
country): 
The extensive margin of exports, defined as the proportion of 
firms that export, will be higher in the small country. 
 
Proof: The extensive margin of exports in country i is given 
by:  
(11) 
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Both for M=Y and M=1, the derivative with respect to 
relative home market size is negative. In other words, the 
extensive margin is larger in relatively small countries, and 
an increase in relative home market size leads to a decrease 
in the extensive margin of exports. 17 
 
The explanation for this is that demand for any composite 
industry good will be higher in the large country, since there 
are more consumers there. Consequently, manufacturing 
firms within an industry in the small country face higher 
demand from abroad than the case in the large country, and 
exports of manufactured goods becomes more profitable in 
the small country.  
 
                                                 
17  Some other models produce similar results. For example, Felbermayr and 
Jung (2012) have developed a Melitz-type model with asymmetric countries 
and no CRS sector. For the small country, the relative mass of firms is less 
than proportional to relative country size, so there is a home market effect 
with respect to the number of firms. As in the present model, the proportion of 
firms that export is larger in the small country. Nevertheless, the size of the 
relative mass of exporting firms is uncertain; thus, we cannot know whether 
there is a reverse home market effect in the number of exporters. Also Medin 
(2003) and Chaney (2008) predict that the extensive margin of exports will be 
larger in small countries, but there is no HME in those models. 
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Using (11) we get the following expression for the relative 
extensive margin of exports (the relative proportion of firms 
that export in h versus f):  
 
(12)   
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The number of firms that export in country i is given by: 
 
(13)  
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The relationship between the number of exporters and home 
market size is summarized as follows 
 
PROPOSITION 3. (The reverse home market effect in the 
number of exporters): 
 
The number of manufacturing exporters in the small country 
will be higher than proportional to country size. 
 
Proof: From (12) we see that the relative number of exporters 
within an industry in h versus f, SN, is equal to 1N . 
Inserting from (10) we get the relative number of all 
exporters: 
(14) 
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For the small country, the relative total number of exporters 
is more than proportional to relative country size (both for 
M=Y and for M=1), even though the relative number of 
firms is less than proportional to country size (due to the 
HME).  
 
The reason for this is that the larger relative extensive 
margin of exports in the small country more than outweighs 
the less than proportional relative number of firms. This can 
be seen from the fact that S lies between 1 and 2Y . I call 
this result the ‘reverse HME’ in exports. The result 
contradicts the HK 1985 model and its Melitz-style extension 
(Baldwin and Forslid, 2010) and corresponds to the “foreign 
market effect” in Medin (2003).18 A higher M reinforces the 
reverse HME in exports, and is strongest for M=1. Since all 
firms export the same amount, independent of country of 
origin (see Equation 8), the reverse HME applies to the 
number of exporters as well as to the country’s total export 
value. 
3.4 Export shares and specialisation 
If M=Y, MSN< 1, the large country will be a net exporter 
of manufactured goods. If M increases, the reverse HME in 
exports is reinforced, and the small country will gain a 
growing share of the world trade in manufactured goods. 
This is because a greater number of manufacturing 
industries in the small country will mean greater demand 
from abroad for small-country manufactured goods. On the 
other extreme where M=1, MSN= Y-1. There is no HME in 
domestic sales (MN=Y) and the small country will be a net 
exporter of manufactured goods. For intermediate values of 
M, trade in manufactured goods may be balanced.  
 
Since industries are country-bounded, there is no direct 
competition with foreign firms within an industry. 
Competition is only indirect and via the demand share for 
the whole industry. Further, within an industry there is only 
one-way trade. There is, however two-way trade in 
manufactured goods, across industries. 
 
                                                 
18  Although here the effect is dampened by the HME as compared to Medin 
(2003) unless M=1 
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Unlike in standard models such as HK 1985 or Baldwin and 
Forslid (2010), the small country will never become 
deindustrialised, as consumers in both countries want to 
consume domestic as well as foreign composite industrial 
goods. Nevertheless, if consumers’ expenditure share for 
manufactured goods exceeds a critical value, μ*, one of the 
countries may specialise in manufacturing production. In 
that case, wages will no longer be equalised, but will 
increase in the country that specialises. If M=Y, the large 
country may specialise; and if M=1, it is the small country 
that may specialise. Specialisation is most likely to occur 
when the countries differ considerably in size. Furthermore, 
in the case where M=1, specialisation is most likely to occur 
for low export costs; but in the case where M=Y, 
specialisation is most likely to occur for intermediate values 
of export costs (see Appendix 3 for details). 
3.5 Welfare effects 
Welfare in country i is given by: 
 
(15)  
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See Appendix 2 for derivation of the second equality. 
Relative welfare in h versus f, fh wwW   is given by:  
 (16)  
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As in the standard models, welfare is highest in the large 
country and increase with the size of the home market. For 
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Y=M welfare also increases with the size of the foreign 
market (which is equivalent to an increase in the number of 
foreign industries). To understand the mechanism behind 
this we will look at the number of consumed varieties, which 
is given by:  
(17)       
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An increase in the size of the home market or the number of 
domestic industries yields access to more varieties and 
increases welfare. An increase in the number of foreign 
industries (which is equivalent to an increase in the size of 
the foreign market for Y=M) reduces the number of 
consumed varieties. This tends to reduce welfare. 
Nevertheless it also increases the number of composite 
industry goods, which tends to increase welfare. The latter 
effects dominates, thus the net effect on welfare is positive.  
 
For M=1, the size of the foreign market does not affect 
welfare. 
3.6 Effects of trade liberalization 
3.6.1 The number of firms that sell in the domestic market and the 
number that export 
(13) shows that both for M=Y and M=1, the derivatives of 
ijii
nsm with respect to T and t are positive. Hence increased 
openness, whether through reduced variable or fixed export 
cost, increases the number of firms that export. As compared 
to increased t, trade liberalisation through increased T has 
an additional positive effect (this appears from the fact that 
in the nominator T is raised to the power of 1  rather 
than just ). The reason is that increased T also leads to a 
reduction of the intensive margin of exports (each firm’s 
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export volume), given by ijz  in (8). With lower fixed export 
costs, an exporting firm will break even in the export market 
selling a smaller amount than before. This allows for more 
exporters. Reduced variable export costs, on the other hand, 
does not affect the intensive margin of exports. Empirical 
evidence in Lawless (2010) suggest that the intensive margin 
of exports is negatively related to fixed export costs and 
independent of variable export costs, just as predicted in the 
present model. She shows that this result will arise in a 
Melitz-type model under the assumption of Pareto 
distributed marginal production costs. The present model 
shows that the result also arises in a model where firms 
have equal marginal production costs.19 
 
(9) shows that both for M=Y and M=1, the derivatives of 
iinm with respect to T and t are negative, thus trade 
liberalisation leads to a decline in the number of firms in 
both countries. The reason for this is that demand is shifted 
from domestically produced composite industry goods to 
foreign produced composite industry goods because the price 
index for the latter  jiPji  , , is reduced. This in turn leads 
to an increase in the expenditure share for these goods (see 
Appendix 2).  The reduction in jiP  happens because the 
number of accessible varieties from each foreign industry 
increases (this effect is strongest for increased T), and 
because the price of each imported variety declines (this 
effect only happens for increased t). From (9) we see that 
increased T and t have a symmetric effect on iinm . 
3.6.2 The HME and the reversed HME 
The effects on the HME and the reversed HME can be 
summarised as follows:  
 
PROPOSITION 4. (Trade liberalisation reinforcement 
effects): 
 
Trade liberalisation reinforces the home market effect as 
well as the reverse home market effect. 
                                                 
19  The result also arises in other models with fixed export costs and initially 
equal firms, such as Medin (2003) and Venables (1994), but the issue is not 
discussed in those articles. 
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Proof: Examining the derivatives of MN with respect to t 
and T in (10) shows that the HME is magnified by trade 
liberalisation (whether through increases in t or T) when 
M=Y. Examining the derivatives of MSN with respect to t 
and T in (14) shows that the reverse HME is magnified by 
trade liberalisation when M=Y. 20  
 
When trade costs are very high, domestic demand towards 
each industry is almost equal in the two countries. When 
trade is liberalised (whether through reductions in t or T), 
however, demand for imports increases more in the small 
country than in the large country because the latter 
produces more composite industrial goods. Therefore each 
industry in the small country experience a larger fall in 
domestic demand than each industry in the large country, 
and the relative number of firms falls.   
 
Even though overall demand for imports increases more in 
the small country, each large-country industry experience a 
lower increase in demand from abroad than each small-
country industry. The reason is that the number of 
industries is higher in the large country. The decline in 
small-country consumers’ expenditure on the few domestic 
composite industry goods must therefore be spread over the 
increase in their expenditure on the many foreign composite 
industry goods. Consequently, increased demand from 
abroad will be larger for a small-country industry than for a 
large-country industry. This yields a greater increase in the 
number of exporters in the small country than in the large 
one. 
3.6.3 Welfare 
From (17) we see that the number of consumed varieties 
declines with reductions in variable trade costs. The model 
thus yields an “anti-variety” effect, just as in Baldwin and 
Forslid (2010).21 As in Baldwin and Forslid (2010), there may 
or may not be an “anti-variety” effect from reductions in 
fixed trade costs. Reductions in both variable and fixed trade 
                                                 
20  For M=1 there is no effect on neither MN nor MSN from trade 
liberalization. 
21  Here the anti-variety effect applies to both the large and the small country, 
while in Baldwin and Forslid (2010) the large country may experience a pro-
variety effect for small levels of trade costs.  
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costs lead to a lower number of produced varieties in both 
countries (see Equation 9) and an increase in the number of 
exported varieties (see Equation 13). The effect on the 
number of exported varieties, however, is stronger for 
reduced fixed trade costs, thus the net effect on the number 
of consumed varieties may be positive.  
 
Despite that the number of consumed varieties can decline, 
(15) shows that welfare increases with trade liberalisation, 
whether through reductions in variable or fixed trade costs. 
To understand this, we should note that the number of 
imports from a foreign industry is always lower than the 
number of consumed varieties from a domestic industry, but 
that trade liberalisation leads to a convergence of two 
numbers (see equation A6 in Appendix 2). This convergence 
is welfare improving, as consumers want to differentiate 
their consumption on the two types of composite industry 
goods.22 
 
The fact that welfare increases despite that the total number 
of consumed goods may decline is in line with Baldwin and 
Forslid (2010). Thus the present model shows that these 
effects may also occur in a model with firms with equal 
marginal production costs.  
 
However, as opposed to standard models, such as HK 1985 
and Baldwin and Forslid (2010), the present model contains 
a welfare convergence effect for M=Y, summarised as 
follows:23  
 
                                                 
22  This can also be seen from the fact that reduced trade costs increases Pii and 
reduces Pji (see Appendix 2). For M=1 the reduction in Pji is larger than the 
increase in Pii, thus welfare increases. For M=Y, the effects on Pii and Pji 
differ in the two countries. For the small country, Pii increases a lot, and Pji 
declines a little because the HME in domestic sales as well as the reversed 
HME in exports are reinforced. Since consumers in the small country 
consume more foreign produced composite industry goods, the reduction in Pji 
has a higher weight in the overall price index, Qi, than the increase in Pii 
(see Equation 3). For the large country the opposite is true: the reduction in 
Pji is larger, but has a lower weight. The net effect on welfare is positive in 
both cases. Consequently access to more foreign produced varieties is more 
important than access to fewer domestically produced varieties. 
23 For M=1, W is independent of trade costs. 
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PROPOSITION 5. (Convergence of welfare): 
Welfare is always higher in the large country, but trade 
liberalisation leads to a more equal welfare level in the two 
countries. 
 
Proof: (16) shows that welfare is always higher in the large 
country, and the derivatives of W with respect to t and T 
show that relative welfare increases with trade liberalisation 
for the case where Y=M. 
4  Empirical evidence 
Equation (11) shows that the extensive margin of exports, 
defined as the proportion of firms that export, ijs is a function 
of the relative home market size, ji yy . In the presence of a 
reverse HME in exports, we should expect the extensive 
margin of exports to decrease with relative home market 
size. Let us now test this prediction. 
4.1 Data and regression variables 
4.1.1 The extensive margin of exports and the relative home 
market size 
Empirical analysis on firm level export data has been a fast-
growing field in international economics.24 Unfortunately, 
firm level data that compare exporters and non-exporters are 
available only for selected countries, and studies are often 
not comparable between countries – with a few exceptions. 
The International Study Group on Exports and Productivity 
(2008) has compared firm level data on exporters and non-
exporters for 14 countries. It finds that the extensive margin 
of exports is ‘loosely decreasing in the size of the domestic 
markets’ (p. 5). To my knowledge this is the only empirical 
study to deal with the relationship between the extensive 
margin of exports and country size. As this was not a major 
issue for the Study Group, it is done very briefly without 
econometrically testing the relationship.25 There are no good 
datasets that include comparable data for most countries in 
the world, and this is therefore a difficult task. Even so, in 
this section I attempt to present first evidence on the 
importance of relative country size for the extensive margin 
of exports, using firm level data from the Enterprise Surveys 
dataset. This dataset is currently the best available, but has 
its limitations, as it covers only developing countries. Thus, 
                                                 
24  Examples include Roberts and Tybout (1997) on Colombian firms; Bernard 
and Jensen (2004) on US firms; Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2004) on 
French firms; Lawless (2009) on Irish firms; Wagner (2001) on German firms; 
Moxnes (2010) on Norwegian firms; and several others. 
25  As the dataset covers only 14 countries, it is difficult to use it for drawing 
inferences. 
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‘Asia/Oceania’ does not include developed countries such as 
Japan and South Korea, or indeed China and India; and 
‘Europe’ does not include any Western European countries. 
However, most countries in Africa and Latin America are 
included. Moreover, the data cover a large number of 
countries – 119 in total – and can be used to construct 
comparable unbiased estimates of the extensive margins of 
exports in these countries.  
 
The data are based on surveys among a representative 
sample of all firms in the non-agricultural formal private 
economy in each country, and were collected between 2006 
and 2011. The data are mainly cross-sectional, but some 
countries appear in different years than others. In addition, 
a few countries appear in more than one year, in which case 
I use the most recent observations. Most observations are 
from 2009 and 2010. The survey is stratified by business 
sector, location and firm size; and the population of firms 
that form the basis of the sample is consistently defined in 
all countries. The same methodology and the same core 
questionnaire are applied in all countries, making data 
comparable across countries. See Enterprise Surveys (2012) 
for further details.  
 
In the present study, I include manufacturing firms only, 
which are drawn from the entire manufacturing sector in the 
countries in question. The data contain firm level 
information about the proportion of output exported.26 I 
define a firm as being an exporter if it exports at least 20% of 
its output. The reason for this is that firms that export a 
very small amount may be testing the export market for the 
first time or may be exporting by coincidence, and most of 
them will probably not survive in the market (see Eaton et 
al., 2008). It is not likely that these firms have paid the full 
fixed export cost, G. In Appendix 5, I show that results are 
robust against defining as ‘exporters’ firms that export any 
amount. Using this information, I construct an estimate of 
the proportion of manufacturing firms that export in each 
country, i.e. the extensive margin of exports. The estimate is 
calculated using sampling weights and is hence unbiased. 
This is the dependent variable. It corresponds to ijs in 
Equation (11) and is called extensive margin of exports. The 
                                                 
26 If this information is missing, the observation is deleted from the sample. 
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main explanatory variable of interest here is the home 
country’s GDP in per cent of the rest of the world's GDP 
(including countries not in the sample). It corresponds to 
ji yy  in Equation (11) and is called relative home market 
size.27 
 
Table 1 presents these two variables for the whole sample, as 
well as for four regional subsamples. Due to missing 
explanatory variables for three countries, the table and the 
regression analyses include only 116 countries.28 As shown in 
the first column of Table 1, the extensive margin of exports 
is small, with an average of 0.14. For three countries in the 
sample (Iraq, Liberia and Vanuatu) the estimated extensive 
margin of exports indicates no exporting firms in the 
manufacturing sector. Also the relative home market size is 
small: on average, home market GDP constitutes only 0.12% 
of the rest of the world's GDP. The median is much smaller 
than the mean (only 0.02), indicating that there are many 
small countries in the sample. Investigating the variables at 
the regional level shows that Europe has a much higher 
average extensive margin of exports (0.27) than the other 
regions.  
 
Group of 
countries 
All Europe Asia/Oceania America Africa 
Variable Extensive 
margin of 
exports 
Relative 
home 
market 
size 
Extensive 
margin of 
exports 
Relative 
home 
market 
size 
Extensive 
margin of 
exports 
Relative 
home 
market 
size 
Extensive 
margin of 
exports 
Relative 
home 
market 
size 
Extensive 
margin of 
exports 
Relative 
home 
market 
size 
Min 0.000 0.001 0.085 0.005 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 
Median 0.116 0.018 0.248 0.063 0.083 0.014 0.139 0.030 0.073 0.011 
Mean 0.137 0.120 0.267 0.187 0.121 0.081 0.125 0.224 0.092 0.029 
Max 0.543 2.231 0.543 1.027 0.435 0.665 0.296 2.231 0.260 0.454 
No of 
observations 
116 116 20 20 25 25 31 31 40 40 
Note: Extensive margin of exports = estimate of the proportion of manufacturing firms that export in each country. 
An exporter is defined as a firm that exports at least 20% of its total output. Relative home market size= home 
country GDP in per cent of the rest of the world's GDP in constant year 2000 US dollars. 
 
Table 1. Extensive margin of exports and relative home market size in 116 countries 
from the Enterprise Surveys dataset  
                                                 
27  GDP is measured in constant (year 2000) US dollars and the data are taken 
from the World Development Indicators. I lack data for Barbados for 2010, 
and use figures for 2009 instead. 
28  I lack GDP data for Afghanistan, and distance for Kosovo and Montenegro. 
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4.1.2 Export costs  
According to Equation (11), not only relative home market 
size, but also export costs, can affect the extensive margin of 
exports. Reductions in either fixed or variable export costs 
are predicted to increase the extensive margin of exports. 
Distance is commonly used as a proxy for export costs. 
Variable export costs may increase with distance due to 
higher transportation costs, while fixed export costs may 
increase with distance due to factors such as greater legal 
and cultural disparities. In addition, Krautheim (2012) 
shows that in the presence of exporting spillovers, fixed 
export costs increase with distance. Consequently, I expect 
more remote countries to have a lower extensive margin of 
exports. While the model in Section 3 is a two-country model, 
the data used for regression analyses include many 
countries, so a variable that corresponds to τ and G (which 
are embedded in t and T respectively in Equation 11) should 
reflect a country's distance to the rest of the world. I 
therefore calculate the variable remoteness, which is an 
output-weighted average of country i’s distance to the rest of 
the world, where weights are equal to the proportion of 
country j’s GDP to the rest of the world’s GDP. This is a 
commonly used measure of average distance (Melitz, 2006).  



n
j
ijji dxremoteness
1                     
j i
GDPGDP
GDP
x
iw
j
j


      
 
ijd is distance from country i to country j, where 0iid , and 
GDPw equals world GDP. In the regression analysis I use 
remoteness to control for both fixed and variable export 
costs.  
 
Data for distance between pairs of countries is provided by 
the CEPII database dist_cepii (Mayer and Zignago, 2011). I 
use the great circle distance measured in kilometres between 
largest cities (the dist variable).  
4.1.3 Other control variables  
Equation (11) predicts that only the relative home market 
size and export costs will affect the extensive margin of 
export (recall that ji mm  is equal to either ji yy or unity). 
However, a simplifying, albeit unrealistic, assumption 
behind the model presented in Section 3 is that cost 
functions are equal across all firms independent of country of 
origin: hence, all firms are equally productive. However, 
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exporters are known to be more productive than non-
exporters, and evidence indicates that more productive firms 
self-select into exporting (see Wagner, 2007). If technology 
levels differ between firms or countries and are correlated 
with GDP, we may therefore get biased estimates for the 
coefficient for relative home market size. To correct for 
differences in technology levels, I include GDP per capita, 
GDP per capita squared, and average firm size. 
 
Less developed countries often have access to a lower level of 
technology than more developed ones. This may reduce the 
competitiveness of manufacturing firms and lead to a lower 
extensive margin of exports. For highly developed countries, 
on the other hand, the relationship may be reversed. These 
countries are characterised by a shift in employment from 
manufacturing to service industries (Syrquin, 1988). There 
are many possible explanations for this (Rowthorn and 
Ramaswamy, 1999). One is that the high cost of labour 
reduces competitiveness in manufacturing industries, 
leading them to relocate to less-developed countries. In this 
case we could expect an inverse U relationship between level 
of development and the extensive margin of exports. 
Alternatively, the relationship might be unambiguously 
positive. For example, higher productivity growth in 
manufacturing industries than in services or declining 
income elasticity of demand for manufactured goods can lead 
to reduction in manufacturing employment, but not as a 
consequence of lower competitiveness. To correct for level of 
development, I include GDP per capita in the analysis. I also 
include GDP per capita squared to test for a possible inverse 
U relationship. Data are taken from the World Development 
Indicators and are measured in constant (year 2000) 1000 
US dollars. 29 
 
Even if countries have access to the same overall level of 
technology, firms within the same country may differ in 
productivity. Differences in economic conditions between 
countries may then lead to differences in average 
productivity levels. For example, Melitz and Ottaviano 
(2008) predict that firms in large countries will have higher 
average productivity levels because tougher competition will 
force the least productive firms out of the market. 
                                                 
29  The World Development Indicators database lacks GDP and GDP per capita 
data for Barbados for 2010, so I use figures for 2009 instead. 
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Felbermayr and Jung (2012), on the other hand, predict the 
opposite, on the grounds that high demand in large countries 
makes room for less productive firms. I do not have data for 
firm productivity, but firm size can be used as a proxy. The 
Enterprise Survey data contains information about whether 
a firm is small (< 20 employees), medium-sized (20 - 99 
employees), or large (> 100 employees). Assigning to these 
categories values of 1, 2 and 3, I construct the variable 
average firm size, which indicates the average firm size in 
the country (I include only firms for which I have 
information about export status). Since the variable does not 
measure the actual average number of employees, we should 
not pay attention to the size of its coefficient, only the sign. 
4.2 Results  
In the empirical analyses I estimate a reduced form of (11), 
namely the following equation: 
(18) extensive margin of exports = α  
+ β1 relative home market size  
+ β2 GDP per capita 
+ β3 GDP per capita squared  
+ β4 remoteness + β5 average firm size + εi 
 
The main variable interest is β1. According to Equation (13), 
we should expect a negative sign.  
 
Since the dependent variable is a proportion that lies 
between zero and one (including three 0’s), it is not 
appropriate to estimate the model using OLS. Instead I use 
an estimator developed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996), 
later known as fractional logit.30 Wagner (2001) discusses 
various econometric methods for dealing with proportions, 
and in the context of microeconometrics of exporting he 
applies the same estimator. In Appendix 5, I show that 
results are robust to applying OLS instead of fractional logit.  
 
Since some countries are observed in different years, I 
include year dummies, as well as dummies for the regions 
that appear in Table 1. I also perform separate analyses for 
each region to see whether results are driven by a particular 
region.
                                                 
30  Also see Wooldridge (2012), pp. 748 -753 for a textbook discussion on 
fractional dependent variables and Ramalho, Ramalho and Murieta (2011) for 
a recent discussion. Computations were done by using the Stata command 
glm, proposed by Baum (2008). 
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All All Europe Asia/Oceania Latin America Africa 
  
Coeff. Marg. effects Coeff. Marg. effects Coeff. Marg. effects Coeff. Marg. effects Coeff. Marg. effects Coeff. Marg. effects 
Relative home market 
size 
–0.2731 –0.0323 –1.1605*** –0.1226*** –1.2997*** –0.2494*** –3.5453** –0.2860** –0.7518*** –0.0793*** –2.2500* –0.1768* 
(0.2230) (0.0265) (0.3120) (0.0319) (0.3932) (0.0786) (1.4433) (0.1192) (0.2045) (0.0215) (1.1971) (0.0958) 
GDP per capita   0.1644*** 0.0174*** 0.2638*** 0.0506*** 1.6533 0.1334 0.1521** 0.0160** –0.2907 –0.0228 
  (0.0430) (0.0047) (0.0829) (0.0167) (1.1132) (0.0915) (0.0726) (0.0079) (0.4087) (0.0321) 
GDP per capita 
squared 
  –0.0058** –0.0006** –0.0081 –0.0016 –0.5935 –0.0479 –0.0065* –0.0007* 0.0831 0.0065 
  (0.0025) (0.0003) (0.0054) (0.0011) (0.4662) (0.0379) (0.0035) (0.0004) (0.0800) (0.0062) 
Remoteness   0.0000 0.0000 0.0010 0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 –0.0001 –0.0000 –0.0001 –0.0000 
  (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0008) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
Average firm size   1.4494*** 0.1531*** 0.5039 0.0967 2.5858*** 0.2086*** 1.0200 0.1075 1.9897*** 0.1563*** 
  (0.3001) (0.0303) (0.6647) (0.1279) (0.5201) (0.0405) (0.8616) (0.0909) (0.4783) (0.0348) 
Constant –1.8085***  –4.8437***  –8.8817  –7.4478***  –3.4645***  –4.2797***  
(0.0873)  (0.7510)  (5.4562)  (1.5783)  (1.2177)  (1.1400)  
Log pseudo–likelihood 
–34.14 –34.14 –31.36 –31.36 –7.622 –7.622 –6.082 –6.082 –8.328 –8.328 –8.841 –8.841 
            
No  of Observations 
116 116 116 116 20 20 25 25 31 31 40 40 
                        
Predicted extensive 
margin  
0.1369 
 
0.1201 
 
0.2590 
 
0.0885 
 
0.1208 
 
0.0900 
            
Doubling the relative 
home market size  
–2.8309 
 
–12.2536 
 
–18.0051 
 
–26.1787 
 
–14.7041 
 
–5.6948 
                        
 
Note: *, ** and *** correspond to significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Marginal effects and predicted 
extensive margins are evaluated at the mean of the independent variables. Year dummies are included in all regressions; regional dummies are 
included in the regressions for the whole sample. 
 
Table 2. Determinants of the extensive margin on exports– results from fractional logit models based on the Enterprise Surveys dataset. 
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Table 2 presents results from the regression analyses. 
Coefficients as well as marginal effects (evaluated at the 
mean of the other independent variables) are reported.31 The 
first four columns present results based on the whole 
sample, where the first two show results without control 
variables. The other columns present results based on the 
regional subsamples.  
 
The coefficient for the main variable of interest, relative 
home market size, is positive but not significant in the 
regression without controls. However, when control variables 
are included, it becomes significant and of the expected sign 
in the whole sample, as well as in all subsamples (albeit only 
at 10% level for Africa).32 Hence, results support the 
hypothesis of a higher extensive margin of exports in small 
countries.  
 
What about the economic significance of the effect? The 
marginal effects should be interpreted relative to the 
predicted extensive margin of exports (evaluated at the 
mean of the other independent variables), which is shown in 
the second last row of Table 2. In the last row I have 
calculated the predicted effects from doubling the relative 
home market size. For the average country in the whole 
sample this would lead to a reduction in the extensive 
margin of exports by 12.3%.33 
 
Are these results robust to alternative specifications? Table 1 
shows that median relative home market size is much lower 
than the mean: thus, the sample consists of many relatively 
small countries and a few large ones. A concern is therefore 
                                                 
31  Coefficients for dummies for years and regions are not reported, but are 
available upon request. 
32  The number of observations is somewhat low for the regional subsamples, and 
results for Asia/Oceania and Africa are not robust to alternative specifications 
(see Appendix 5). Therefore, results for the regional subsamples should be 
interpreted with care. 
33  For the whole sample, the marginal effect is equal to 0.123. The predicted 
extensive margin of exports is 0.120; thus an increase in relative home 
market size by one percentage point is predicted to lead to a decrease in the 
extensive margin of exports by 103% (i.e. below 0, which is not possible). We 
should, however, bear in mind that average relative home market size for the 
sample countries is only 0.120% (see Table 1), thus an increase of one 
percentage point is a very large increase. If, instead, we double the relative 
home market size, the predicted reduction in the extensive margin of exports 
is 103%*0.120= 12.3%. It can be argued that this reasoning is imprecise, since 
doubling of the relative home market size cannot be considered a marginal 
change, and this is a non-linear model. However, results from the linear 
model in Appendix 5 are close to the ones presented here (except for 
Asia/Oceania), so the approximation seem fairly good. 
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whether the results are driven by a few large countries. This 
is not the case. Omitting the 5% or the 10% largest countries 
from the sample does not alter the significance of the 
coefficient for relative home market size. In fact, the 
marginal effect becomes even higher in these reduced 
samples (about twice that in the full sample).34 In Appendix 
5, I present results from two other sensitivity analyses. 
First, I estimate Equation (18) using OLS. The marginal 
effects of relative home market size are similar to those from 
the main analysis and are reported in Table A1. Secondly, I 
perform an analysis redefining the extensive margin of 
exports. Instead of defining a firm as an exporter if it exports 
at least 20% of its output, I now define a firm as an exporter 
if it exports any amount. Obviously, this increases the 
extensive margin of exports – new summary statistics are 
shown in Table A2. Results from the regression analyses are 
reported in Table A3; they show that, also in this case, the 
marginal effects are similar to those in the main analyses.35  
 
The coefficient for average firm size is positive and 
significant in the whole sample as well as for Asia/Oceania 
and Africa, and the results are robust to alternative 
specifications (see Appendix 5). Thus, larger average firm 
size is generally associated with a higher extensive margin of 
exports. The coefficient for GDP per capita is significant and 
of the expected sign for the whole sample, as well as for 
Europe and Latin America. Further, the coefficient for GDP 
per capita squared is negative and significant for the whole 
sample, as well as for Latin America. Consequently, there is 
some evidence of an inverse U relationship between the 
extensive margin of exports and welfare level, but the results 
are not robust to alternative specifications (see Appendix 5). 
Surprisingly, the coefficient for remoteness is not significant 
– in the whole sample, or in any of the subsamples. I tried 
replacing remoteness with alternative measures of average 
distance to the rest of the world such as an unweighted 
average. None of the alternative measures produced 
significant results for average distance. I also tried replacing 
                                                 
34  Moreover, omitting the 5% or 10% smallest countries does not alter the 
results for relative home market size in terms of significance or size of the 
marginal effect. 
35  I also experimented with calculating the relative home market size using 
population size rather than GDP. Results regarding the coefficient for relative 
home market size were not altered in terms of significance, but the marginal 
effects were somewhat lower. Since it is income level, rather than population 
size, that determines demand, I chose to present the results with GDP as a 
measure of country size. 
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GDP per capita and remoteness with their logs, and GDP per 
capita squared with (log of GDP per capita) squared. There 
was little change in the results regarding relative home 
market size. 
 
To conclude, the empirical analyses support the hypothesis 
of larger extensive margins of exports within manufacturing 
industries in small countries than in large countries. 
Doubling the relative home market size is associated with a 
decrease in the extensive margin of exports by 12.3% for the 
average country. 
 5 Conclusions 
 
In this paper I have presented a model of trade in 
manufactured goods where the well-known HME in the 
number of manufacturing firms coexists with a reverse HME 
in the number of manufacturing exporters. While small 
countries have lower profitability in domestic sales of 
manufactured goods due to increasing returns to scale, trade 
costs and access to a small home market, they have higher 
profitability in exports of manufactured goods, due to access 
to a large foreign market. For the small country, this leads to 
the relative number of manufacturing firms selling in the 
domestic market being less than proportional to the relative 
country size. The relative number of manufacturing 
exporters on the other hand, will be more than proportional 
to the relative country size. One consequence of this is that 
the extensive margin of exports of manufactured goods, 
defined as the proportion of firms that export, becomes 
higher in relatively small countries. These results contradict 
those from benchmark HME models, whether dealing with 
homogeneous or heterogeneous firms, which predict that the 
extensive margin of exports is independent of country size.  
 
The prediction of larger extensive margins of exports in 
small countries is tested using data on firm level exports 
from 116 developing countries from the Enterprise Surveys 
dataset. Using a fractional logit analysis, I find that, for the 
average country, a doubling of home country GDP relative to 
the rest of the world's GDP is associated with a decrease in 
the extensive margin of exports of manufactured goods by 
12.3%. 
 
The dataset used in the present study has obvious 
limitations, as it covers only developing countries. A topic for 
future research is to obtain comparable firm level data for 
more developed countries, so that we would be able to test 
the relationship for these countries as well. Another topic for 
future research is to test more directly the hypothesis of the 
co-existence of an HME in domestic sales and a reverse HME 
in exports. As obtaining comparable data on the number of 
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firms and exporters for a large set of countries would be very 
difficult, this could be done by using values of domestic sales 
and exports instead. 
 Appendices 
Appendix 1. Derivation of demand functions 
The outer level of the subutility function for manufactured 
goods in country i is given by:  
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ik  indexes an industry located in country i. The inner level is 
given by: 
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The price index in country i for manufactured goods 
produced within an industry located in country j is given by: 
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Since firms are symmetric, this reduces to Equation (4) in 
the text. The price index for manufactured goods in country i 
is given by 
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Since industries are symmetric, this reduces to Equation (3) 
in the text. As pointed out by Helpman and Krugman (1985, 
p. 120), consumer expenditure shares on each product in a 
separable utility function of this kind depend on prices and 
the number of varieties only. By utility maximization of the 
outer level of the CES function, we get the following 
expression for demand in country i for a composite industry 
good produced in country j: 
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The share of expenditure for manufactured goods allocated 
to 
ji
C is hence equal to  
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Now, for a firm from country j, demand from country i is 
given by: 
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Since firms are symmetric and industries only differ by 
country of origin, I have omitted   and k  from the above 
expressions and let the first subscript denote the country 
where the good is produced, and the second subscript denote 
the country where the good is sold. Inserting from (A1) in 
(A2) gives equations (2) in the text.  
Appendix 2. Derivation of the equilibrium 
The equilibrium conditions for domestically produced goods 
and imports respectively in country i are given by: 
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Dividing (A4) by (A3) and rearranging yields the following 
expression for the number of imported varieties relative to 
the number of domestic varieties in country i. 
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(A5) is the key to solving the equilibrium. It shows that the 
number of imports from a foreign industry is always lower 
than the number of consumed varieties from a domestic 
industry. Nevertheless, trade liberalisation, whether 
through increased T or t, leads to a convergence of two 
numbers. From (A5) we can also see that the number of 
imports relative to the number of domestically produced 
varieties is given by: 
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be 
2Y times larger in the small country for M=Y. 
 
(A3), (A4) and (A5) represent two equations each: one for h 
and one for f. Inserting (A5) for country i in (A4) for country i 
and rearranging gives Equation (9) in the text. Dividing (A3) 
for home by (A3) for foreign, using (A5) for both home and 
foreign, and rearranging yields Equation (10) in the text. 
The first part of Equation (11) in the text follows directly 
from (A5), while the second part follows from inserting from 
(9). By combining (A5) and (9) we get Equation (13) in the 
text. 
 
Inserting for (9) and (11) in (4) we get the following 
expressions for iiP  and jiP  
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Using this in (3), we express 
i
Q as: 
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Inserting for jiP and iQ  in (A1), we can express the 
expenditure share for a foreign composite industry good for 
consumers in country i as: 
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Appendix 3. Criteria for specialisation in production of 
manufactured goods 
Labour used in the manufacturing sector in country i is 
equal to:  
(A6)     
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The last equality follows from (7), (8) and (A5) for country j. 
By inserting from (9) for both countries, we can express 
relative labour used in the manufacturing sector in country i 
versus country j as: 
 
 (A7)               
1 22
22


Tt
y
y
Tt
m
m
y
y
Tt
m
m
TtTt
m
m
Tt
m
m
y
y
y
y
l
l
j
i
i
j
j
i
i
j
j
i
j
i
j
i
j
i
I
j
I
i


 ji   
 
The reverse home market effect in exports: A cross-country study of the extensive margin of exports 43 
             
 
0
*



ji yy

 
 
For specialisation to occur in a country, the total labour force 
in that country must be employed in the manufacturing 
sector, i.e. i
I
i
yl  , where we use the fact that 
ii
yl  . This 
will happen if consumers’ expenditure share for 
manufactured goods,  , is higher than a critical value,
* . 
Define
I
f
I
hI
l
l
L  , which denote relative labour used in the 
manufacturing sector in h versus f. From (A7) we see that for 
M=Y, IL  is lower than relative country size ( YLI  ), thus 
specialisation may occur in the large country. For M=1, IL is 
larger than Y, thus specialisation may occur in the small 
country. For intermediate values of M, the probability of 
specialisation is lower, but for sufficiently high , 
specialisation may occur in either country, depending on the 
size of M.  
 
For M=Y, we find 
* by setting f
I
f yl   and inserting from 
(9) in the second part of (A6):  
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For M=1, we find 
* by setting h
I
h yl   and inserting from 
(9) in the second part of (A6) 
ββ
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In both cases, specialisation is most likely to occur when the 
countries differ greatly in size. The effect of trade 
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liberalisation is somewhat different in the two cases. Trade 
liberalisation has two opposite effects on labour used in the 
manufacturing sector: i) it reduces labour used in domestic 
sales of manufactured goods, and ii) it increases labour used 
in exports of manufactured goods. For the case where M=1, 
the derivatives of 
*  with respect to t and T are negative.  
In the small country, ii) dominates over i), and trade 
liberalisation leads to increased use of labour in the 
manufacturing sector. This increases the probability of 
specialisation.  For M = Y, the derivatives of 
*  with 
respect to t and T are ambiguous. But 1
*   for 
10  Tt  and 1
*   for either prohibitive export costs or 
for completely liberalised trade. Thus, in the two limit cases 
where 0Tt  and 1Tt , specialisation will not occur. 
Further, 
* declines when Tt  is near 0 and increases 
when 
Tt  is near 1. This is because ii) dominates in the 
large country when export costs are high, and i) dominates 
when export costs are low. This could indicate that 
specialisation is most likely to occur for intermediate values 
of export costs. 
Appendix 4. Criteria for non-exporters in both countries 
Equation (12) shows that the extensive margin of exports is 
larger in the small country, and Equation (11) shows that 
trade liberalisation increases the extensive margin of exports 
in both countries. Therefore, if export costs decrease, the 
extensive margin of exports will reach 1 in the small country 
first. Consequently, there will be non-exporters in both 
countries as long as Y is not too small relative to openness. 
From (11), we can write the proportion of firms that export 
in h as: 
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Note that  Ttbhf ,  here equals the relative number of firms 
in h versus f, N. Criterion for the existence of non-exporters 
in h:  
 
   TtbTtas hfhf ,,1 
        
 
 
Let us focus on the case where t=1 and T<1, i.e. there are 
only fixed costs of exporting.36 The derivatives of the 
functions a  and hfb  with respect to T are given by: 
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In addition, for M=Y, we have: 
 
0)0( a  and 1)1( a  
1)0( hfb  and Ybhf )1(  
 
Consequently, )(Tbhf  is a downward sloping curve, while 
)(Ta is an upward sloping curve that cuts the )(Tbhf   curve 
from below for a value of )(Ta   between Y and 1. This 
corresponds to values of T between 1
1
Y  and 1. Thus 
1
1
 YT  is a sufficient but not necessary condition 
for 1hfs , while 1T  is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for 1hfs . The two points will be close when β is 
large, i.e. when η is large. In other words, if composite 
industry goods from different countries are good substitutes, 
the proportion of firms that export will reach 1 in the small 
country only when trade is highly liberalised and/or 
countries differ greatly in size. If they are poor substitutes, 
on the other hand, this will happen for intermediate values 
of trade costs and/or country size differences. This is 
                                                 
36  The case for t<1 and T=1 is almost analogous. 
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reasonable, as a high η means that a domestic composite 
industry goods can easily substitute a foreign composite 
industry goods in the large country; thus, demand for small-
country products from abroad is lower.  
 
It can be shown that if T increases further beyond the 
intersection of )(Ta and )(Tbhf , all firms will export in the 
small country, while only a fraction will sell in the domestic 
market. In the large country, on the other hand, only a 
fraction will export while all firms sell in the domestic 
market. If T increases even further so that fixed export costs 
become lower than the domestic market entry costs i.e. 
1T , all firms may export in both countries, whereas only a 
fraction may sell in their domestic markets. The value of T 
for this to happen is given by the intersection between 
)(Tbhf  and
)(
1
Ta
.37 A necessary but not sufficient condition 
for this to happen is
1
1
 


 YT , whereas a sufficient but not 
necessary condition is
1
2
 


 YT .  
 
For M=1, 1
1
 YT is a sufficient and necessary condition 
for 1ijs . Consequently, in this case the range of Y and T 
that makes possible an equilibrium with non-exporting firms 
in both countries is narrowed as compared to the case where 
M=Y. For values of 1
1
 
1
1


   YTY , all firms will export 
in the small country, whereas only a fraction export in the 
large country. For
1
1
 


 YT , all firms will export in both 
countries, while only a fraction will sell in their domestic 
markets. 
                                                 
37  Note that bhf(T) is now equal to nf/nh, which denotes the number of 
exporters in the large country divided by the number of exporters in the small 
country (since all firms export). 
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Appendix 5. Results of sensitivity analyses 
 
  All All Europe  Asia/Oceania Latin America Africa 
  Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
Relative home market 
size 
–0.0281 –0.1000*** –0.2215** –0.1701 –0.0613*** –0.1901* 
(0.0195) (0.0263) (0.0902) (0.1362) (0.0139) (0.0995) 
GDP per capita  0.0195*** 0.0415* 0.1301 0.0159* –0.0325 
 (0.0066) (0.0193) (0.1905) (0.0089) (0.0346) 
GDP per capita 
squared 
 –0.0006 –0.0007 –0.0504 –0.0007 0.0086 
 (0.0004) (0.0013) (0.0810) (0.0004) (0.0070) 
Remoteness  –0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 –0.0000 –0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Average firm size  0.1421*** 0.1105 0.2441*** 0.1062 0.1835*** 
 (0.0344) (0.1521) (0.0614) (0.1084) (0.0502) 
Constant 0.1406*** –0.1293* –1.1498 –0.3950* –0.0131 –0.0882 
(0.0105) (0.0759) (1.2913) (0.2019) (0.1453) (0.1027) 
Observations 
116 116 20 25 31 40 
  
    
  
R–squared 0.0070 0.5376 0.7232 0.4933 0.1969 0.3596 
            
Predicted extensive 
margin 
0.1372 0.1372 0.2674 0.1206 0.1246 0.0923 
  
    
  
Doubling the relative 
home market size 
–2.4577 –8.7464 –15.4901 –11.4246 –11.0202 –5.9728 
            
Note: *, ** and *** correspond to significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Robust standard errors in 
parenthesis. The regressions for the whole sample include regional dummies, and all regressions include year 
dummies.  
Table A1. Determinants of the extensive margin on exports – results from OLS 
regression based on the Enterprise Surveys dataset 
 
 
Group of 
Countries 
All Europe Asia/ 
Oceania 
Latin America Africa 
Variable Extensive margin of 
exports 
Extensive margin of 
exports 
Extensive margin of 
exports 
Extensive margin of 
exports 
Extensive margin of 
exports 
Min 0.000 0.163 0.000 0.026 0.000 
Median 0.178 0.381 0.103 0.194 0.109 
Mean 0.198 0.388 0.156 0.201 0.128 
Max 0.775 0.775 0.477 0.516 0.394 
No of obs. 116 20 25 31 40 
Note: Extensive margin of exports = estimate of the proportion of manufacturing firms that export in each country. 
An exporter is defined as a firm that exports any amount 
Table A2. Extensive margin of exports in the Enterprise Surveys dataset, all firms that 
export any amount 
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  All All Europe  Asia/Oceania Latin America Africa 
  Coeff. Marg. effects Coeff. Marg. effects Coeff. Marg. effects Coeff. Marg. effects Coeff. Marg. effects Coeff. Marg. effects 
Relative home market 
size 
0.0864 0.0137 –0.8160*** –0.1179*** –0.9854** –0.2335** –3.7905*** –0.4002*** –0.4087** –0.0643** –1.1529 –0.1185 
(0.1923) (0.0305) (0.2455) (0.0350) (0.4664) (0.1103) (1.3535) (0.1464) (0.1609) (0.0258) (0.8808) (0.0902) 
GDP per capita    0.1808*** 0.0261*** 0.1406 0.0333 2.4766** 0.2615** 0.2184*** 0.0344*** –0.4552 –0.0468 
   (0.0499) (0.0072) (0.1714) (0.0404) (1.0478) (0.1107) (0.0733) (0.0123) (0.3094) (0.0318) 
GDP per capita 
squared 
   –0.0071** –0.0010** 0.0033 0.0008 –0.8715** –0.0920** –0.0105*** –0.0016*** 0.1154* 0.0119* 
   (0.0032) (0.0005) (0.0105) (0.0025) (0.4279) (0.0446) (0.0037) (0.0006) (0.0622) (0.0063) 
Remoteness    0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 –0.0000 –0.0000 –0.0001 –0.0000 
   (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0010) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
Average firm size    1.7259*** 0.2494*** 0.5832 0.1382 2.3708*** 0.2503*** 2.0473** 0.3223** 2.2563*** 0.2319*** 
   (0.3063) (0.0443) (0.6549) (0.1548) (0.5579) (0.0513) (0.8462) (0.1375) (0.4398) (0.0392) 
Constant –1.4064***  –4.8938***  –5.2163  –6.4631***  –5.0194***  –4.6379***   
(0.0906)   (0.5709)   (6.8756)   (1.5625)   (1.3227)   (0.8657)   
Log pseudo–likelihood 
–42.18 –42.18 –37.64 –37.64 –8.595 –8.595 –7.051 –7.051 –10.73 –10.73 –10.49 –10.49 
           
  
No of observations 
116 116 116 116 20 20 25 25 31 31 40 40 
                        
Predicted extensive 
margin 
  0.1369   0.1369   0.3857   0.12   0.1957   0.1163 
           
  
Doubling the relative 
home market size 
  –1.2009   –10.3346   –11.3208   –27.0135   –3.9603   –4.2889 
                        
Note: *, ** and *** correspond to significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Marginal effects and predicted extensive margins are 
evaluated at the mean of the independent variables.  Year dummies are included in all regressions, and regional dummies are included in the regressions for the whole sample.
Table A3. Determinants of the extensive margin on exports– results from fractional logit models based on the Enterprise Surveys 
dataset. All firms that export 
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